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Allen: Law of the Sea: The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between

NOTE
LAW OF THE SEA: THE DELIMITATION OF
THE MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE BAHAMAS*
INTRODUCTION

In a science based civilization dependent upon exploitation of dwindling
supplies of natural resources, the law of the sea has undergone rapid and
uneven development. Freedom of the seas, 2 a doctrine designating, the oceans
as public highways for commerce and security, has given way to a trend of
decisions which features several contemporaneous maritime regimes 3 through
which nations claim control over ocean areas for a variety of exclusive and
non-exclusive uses. This trend has been accelerated by the worldwide need to
reach previously inaccessible resources and facilitated by corresponding technological advances which permit access. 4
Where two or more nations abut the same ocean area, the problem of
drawing boundary lines becomes manifest. International law has developed
*Editors'Note. This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the fall 1980 quarter.
1. See, e.g., M. MCDouGAL & W. Bu=KE, THm PunIc ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
McDougal and Burke provide a comprehensive overview of the law of the sea in the post1945 era. The authors suggest that the interests of the world community in the oceans are
best served by a balance of inclusive (public) and exclusive (private) uses. This balance
would yield maximum reasonable use of the oceans by accommodating the most substantial claims of nations, while maintaining the oceans as an essentially public resource.
The effect of technology on this balance is a prime consideration in the development
of the law of the sea. Science consumes natural resources and creates the technology
necessary to extract them. Since World War II, this cause and effect relationship has created
a trend of decision toward greater closure of previously public ocean areas. This trend
was predicted with clarity by Professors McDougal and Burke. See id. at 4-5.
2. See H. GRoTius, DE Juru BELLI AC PACds 190-91 (1646 ed. F. Kelsey trans. 1925). Hugo
iGrotius, the famous Dutch Jurist, was the first to conceive of freedom of the seas as an
international legal principle. Groitus reasoned that, as the seas were incapable of division,
they were the public property of mankind, incapable of exclusive national ownership.
The primary application of the doctrine was in regard to a coastal state competence to
enforce its domestic laws against foreign vessels outside the three-mile territorial sea limit.
See 4 M. WHITEIMAN, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 503-04

(1965).

3. The law of the sea includes several regimes or areas of control which overlap in
location and purpose. The international race to claim adjacent ocean areas has left these
various regimes rather poorly defined in size and scope. Starting from an imaginary coast
and traveling seaward, the first three to twelve miles of ocean area is the territorial sea. From
that limit, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends to a distance 200 nautical miles from
the coast. The seabed adjacent to the coast falls under the regime of the continental shelf.
International law has not yet formulated a seaward limit for the shelf regime, although the
200 nautical mile EEZ limit has been suggested. See E. LuAm,, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-Bm
(2d ed. 1977). The inside cover of this book contains a useful illustration that describes the
several maritime regimes and their location relative to the coast.
4. See M. BARAM, D. RiCE & W. LE, MARINE MINING OF THE CONTINENTAL SEL 59-94
(1978). Technological capability will make marine mineral exploitation at very great depths
possible within the foreseeable future.
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rules and principles that ostensibly provide for presumptive resolution of these
inchoate maritime boundary disputes.5 In light of the urgent need to develop
ocean resources, the maritime boundary delimitation process is both vital and
volatile. A threshold issue, therefore, is whether international law as a body of
treaties, 6 cases, 7 practices 8 and customary norms9 is an appropriate and effective forum for resolution of these sensitive disputes.
This issue need not be resolved at this stage in the development of the
law of maritime boundary delimitation. The international community is
proceeding with this development under the tacit assumption that a public
order of the oceans is both necessarylo and vital to minimum world order."
There is a growing recognition even among international law's most severe
5. It has been estimated that 105 maritime boundaries must be negotiated in the
Caribbean Sea alone. See Nweihed, EEZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-Enclosed Caribbean
Sea: Recent Agreements Between Venezuela and Her Neighbors, 8 OCEAN DEv. & INT'. L.J. 1,
1 (1980).
6. While treaties normally bind only nations that are parties to them, many form the
basis for the development of internationally accepted legal principles. A case in point is
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter the Geneva Convention].
Article 6 of that convention, which describes the method for delimiting continental shelf
boundaries, has become part of the corpus of customary international law. See notes 68 & 71
and accompanying text, infra.
7. Decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or of international courts of
arbitration lack the authoritative status of cases in common law jurisdictions. They are more
properly viewed as reflections of the status of treaties and state practices than as rules of
law. See G. VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS 19-20 (3d ed. 1976). Cf. Thirty Hogsheads of
Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815). Chief Justice Marshall recognized the
authoritative status of the law of nations in the courts of all civilized and commercial states.
Such decisions were to be received "not as authority, but with respect." Id.
8. E.g., The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 188 (1872). The court held that the law of
the sea was applicable to an action by owners of a British vessel against the owners of an
American vessel for damages arising out of a collision. These navigation rules, originally
enacted by the United States and Great Britain, had been elevated to the status of
international law through usage by more than thirty maritime nations. This illustrates the
process by which state practices become binding rules of international law.
9. The term customary norn is used to describe a rule, holding, treaty or practice
which has become part of the corpus of international law. President Jimmy Carter, in pro.
claiming August 19, 1977 World Law Day, called for the development of legal norms
that would further the interests of world peace and security. See Presidential Proclamation
No. 4514, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,299 (1977).
10. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is
engaged in an ongoing attempt to draft a comprehensive treaty which will resolve problems
connected with the current trend toward greater closure of the oceans. See, e.g., Oxman,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh Session (1978),
73 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979). The United States views UNCLOS III as a necessary development. See, e.g., Kissinger, Secretary Kissinger Discusses Progress and Goals in the Law of
the Sea Negotiations, 75 DEP'T S'rAT BULL. 333 (1976).
11. See McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A PolicyOriented Perspective, in M. McDouGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES ON WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157
(1960). Minimum world order describes an international environment in which nations
can resolve their disputes without resort to violence. Professor McDougal measures the
success of the international legal system against this standard.
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critics that a system of international dispute settlement, under cognizable
rules of law and globally endorsed procedures, is a necessary and practicable
2
goal.'
The primary objective of a law of maritime boundary delimitation is to
create certainty of expectation 3 for prospective ocean resource developers,
whether public or private. Interested parties will not risk the substantial investments' 4 necessary to extract ocean resources if the target site is the subject
of an international dispute. To quiet title to the world's seabed, international
law must develop rules and principles which presumptively declare the limits
of a given state's jurisdiction vis-4-vis its coastal neighbors. 5 Because legal
doctrine alone cannot resolve all such boundary disputes, recourse to authoritative dispute settlement by judicial or quasi-judicial processes must be available.' 6
12. For a discussion of international law as an effective forum for the conduct of
international relations, see Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism
Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 198 (1980).

Professor Boyle chronicles the discrediting of international law which occurred as a response
to the failures of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, Reliance on the rule
of law, in this view, led to World War II. Boyle concludes, however, that the extreme
hazards of power politics in the nuclear age have forced reconsideration of international law
as a rational practical means of pursuing world security. For a more forthright defense of
international law, see Onuf, InternationalLegal Orderas an Idea, 73 AM. J. INTL L. 244 (1979).
13. Certainty of expectation refers to the lawyer's task of predicting the legal outcome
of a maritime boundary dispute. Precision and clarity in the delimitation process facilitates
this objective, reduces the potential for protracted maritime disputes, and obviates recourse
to judicial or arbitral settlement. See generally M. McDouGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., Hearings on Outer Continental Shelf Policy Issues, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10

(1972) (statement of Hollis M. Doyle). As of 1972, 600,000 acres of outer continental shelf
off Washington and Oregon had been explored at a cost of about $100 million. Despite high
expectations, only uneconomical quantities of petroleum had been found. See generally
IV. AHERm, OIL AND THE OuTER CoASTAL SHELF: THE GEORGES BANK CASE 9-12 (1978).
15. The current dispute between Greece and Turkey over control of the Aegean Sea
continental shelf underscores the serious nature of maritime boundary disputes. In 1978
Turkey issued licenses to private interests for petroleum exploration in the area. The two
nations disputed the legal effect of the presence of small Greek islands located near the
Turkish coast. Greece invoked article 6 of the Geneva Convention, contending that the
area should be delimited by drawing a median line between the islands and Turkey. See
Geneva Convention, supra note 6. Turkey countered, stating that the islands be ignored.
After an exchange of diplomatic notes the parties commenced boundary negotiations which
remained deadlocked for a year and a half. Over Turkish objections, Greece submitted the
dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which held that it lacked jurisdiction
over the matter. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1978] I.C.J. 1. The ongoing controversy
has caused a serious rift in Greco-Turkish relations. The United States has joined other
nations in urging the two nations to mutually consent to third party settlement. See Bennet,
United States Calls for Greece-Turkey Talks on Aegean Sea Dispute, 75 DEP'r STATE BuLL.
373, 374 (1976). See generally Evans, Judicial Decisions, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 492 (1979).
16. United States policy, which accords with international trends, favors submission of
maritime boundary disputes to either the ICJ or a court of arbitration when negotiations
fail. E.g., Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Guld of Maine Area, March 29, 1979, United States- Canada, T.I.A.S. No.
9448. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), the draft treaty being developed
at UNCLOS III, provides in part XV detailed procedures for international judicial settle-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

The combination of clear, predictable legal rules of boundary delimitation
and ready access to judicial settlement will provide participant nations with
the opportunity to assess probable outcomes.' 7 This would result in the
creation of a presumptive boundary, 8 and thus influence nations to adopt
realistic negotiating positions. The certainty of expectation provided would
promote the maximum reasonable use' 9 of vital ocean resources.
Numerous complex policy considerations present obstacles to the development of this public order. An international legal system cannot survive unless
it appears to the majority of participants that subscription to its operation
is in their exclusive national interests.' 0 Complicating this threshold consideration is the geopolitical conflict between the developed and third
worlds. 21 Third world nations, acting as a bloc,22 have asserted a preferential
ment. E.g., Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea, Informal Composite
Negotiating Text, 8 U.N. GAOR (6th sess.) 45-48, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 10 (1978).
See generally Adede, Law of the Sea - The Integration of the System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Draft Convention as a Whole, 7.2AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1978).
17. Colson, The United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf Arbitration, 72 Am. J.
IN T'L L. 95, 111-12 (1978). Colson, an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Assistant Legal
Adviser for Oceans, International Environment, and Scientific Affairs for the United States
Department of State, discusses the problems confronting national decision makers in the
promulgation of lawful limits to coastal state control. He calls for further judicial expression
of the law of maritime boundary delimitation as a remedy.
18. A presumptive boundary, formed by operation of law, would provide an efficacious
reference point for subsequent negotiation. The equidistance-special circumstances rule of
article 6 of the Geneva Convention, supra note 6, potentially establishes a median or equidistance line as a presumptive boundary. Unfortunately, state practice and trends of decision
have failed to apply the rule in this manner. See note 134 and accompanying text, infra.
The lack of certainty can be ameliorated by provisional use agreements pending settlement. See Press Conference with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, reprinted in 79 Dss'T STATE
BULL. 21 (1979).
19. Maximum reasonable use has been offered as the test for lawfulness of exclusive
national uses of ocean areas and resources. See McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb
Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955). Professors
McDougal and Schlei defended United States nuclear arms testing in the South Pacific during
the early 1950's as lawful, considering the importance of the activity and the limited closure
of the ocean it required. The urgency attached to developing maritime petroleum resources
provides an interesting comparison.
20. For example, Venezuela has consistently denied the applicability of the equidistancespecial circumstances rule in itsboundary negotiations. The presence of numerous islands
of varied national affiliation near its coast renders application of the rule highly undesirable,
and it has therefore called for "delimitation in accordance with equitable principles." This
is the rule of international law announced by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Case, [L19691 I.C.J. 12. The court in the North Sea Case considered a wide variety of physical
features in boundary delimitation and offered no presumptive boundary as a negotiation
starting point. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
21.
See generally R. ANAND, LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTIuES

(1975).

22. Organized developing nation activities at UNCLOS III regarding deep seabed
mining has led at least one United States public official to openly reconsider American
participation in the conference. See Remarks of Elliot L. Richardson, Ambassador at Large
and Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conference at the United
Nations, reprinted in 77 D.P'T STATE BULL. 389 (1977).
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right to exploit certain ocean resources.2 3 These resources, it is claimed, are
the common heritage of mankind, to be held in trust for the benefit of the
2
developing world. Global subscription to a regime of maritime boundary delimitation is
further impeded when individual nations view the operation of international
law in a particular local dispute as inimical to their best interests. 2 5 A nation
is unlikely to concede title to a seabed rich in petroleum merely for the sake
26
of the international legal system.
23.

Most of the controversy surrounds the regime of the deep seabed and the po-

tentially vast concentrations of manganese nodules which exist there. These potato-sized
lumps of minerals apparently precipitate out of sea water, and are a rich potential
source of manganese, nickel, copper and zinc. See REPORT OF THE MARINE BOARD OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMy OF SCIENCES, 'MINING IN THE OUTER CONTrNENTAL SHELF AND IN THE DEEP

(1975). The issue has proved exceptionally thorny for the United States. On November
14, 1974, Deepsea Ventures, Inc., a Delaware corporation of multinational ownership, requested the State Department to recognize its exclusive claim to mine manganese nodules
and to protect its claims from. encroachment by other nations. See Notice of Discovery and
Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of
Investment, by Deepsea Ventures, Inc. (November 14, 1974), reprinted in 14 INTL L.
MATERIALS 66 (1975). The State Department refused either to recognize the claim, or to
actively protect Deepsea's activities. However, the State Department announced the United
States' position that mining in the seabed beyond national jurisdiction was a permissible
use of the high seas under existing international law. Id.
In response, third world nations at UNCLOS III developed the common heritage of
mankind doctrine which declared that resources of the deep seabed were held in trust for
all nations. To ensure that nations with a technological headstart would not deplete the
manganese nodule supply, these nations proposed creation of a Deep Seabed Authority. The
Authority would manage development of the resource and distribute the proceeds among all
nations with the bulk earmarked for the developing world. ICNT article 150, supra note 16,
at 25. The United States has accepted the Seabed Authority and revenue sharing beyond
the 200-mile limit in principle. However, it is the strategy of the third world bloc to delay
agreement until the technology gap can be narrowed. See Adede, Developing Countries'
Contributions to Development of Institutional Arrangements for an International Seabed
Authority, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1977); Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the
United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1979).
The impasse has generated considerable congressional support for passage of a United
States deep seabed mining bill which would offer the assistance requested by Deepsea
Ventures, Inc. See H.R. REP. No. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.; 124 CONG. REc. H7341 to H7382
(1978). See also Richardson, Review of the Law of the Sea Conference and Deep Seabed
Mining Legislation/House Committee on the Environment and Natural Resources, 77 DFEPr
STATE BULL. 751 (1977).
24. For a discussion of third world response to the prospect of a United States deepsea
mining bill, see Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, 8 OCEAN DEv. &
IrNT'L L. 223 (1980). The author, applying Roman civil law principles, argues that freedom
of the seas never included the right of nations to exclusively mine the 'seabed. In his
view, manganese nodules are res communes (subject to public ownership and use) and not
res nullius (unclaimed property which could become owned).
25. The position of Turkey in the Aegean Sea dispute with Greece provides an
illuminating example. See note 15 supra.
26. Obviously, a legal regime that rigidly produces unacceptable results to one or more
participants cannot offer minimum public order. At some point certainty of expectation must
yield to situational exigencies. The dilemma may best be solved by routine submission of
disputes to the ICJ or arbitral courts. See Baxter, Two Cheers for InternationalAdjudication,
65 A.B.A. J. 1 185 (1979).
OCEAN
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Against this background, a fledgling public order has emerged.2 7 Whether it
can provide .the certainty of expectation necessary to assure maximum reasonable use and minimum public order is unclear. This will be answered as
nations attempt to settle the numerous maritime boundary disputes that have
emerged. 28 One such dispute has arisen in the waters off the coast of Florida.
The United States and the Bahamas have made divergent, overlapping claims
to the waters of the Florida Straits, and to the seabed of the Blake Plateau.29
The Florida Straits, through which the Gulf Stream runs, is an area of deep
water lying directly between South Florida and the Great and Little Bahama
Banks. 30 Only fifty miles separate Bimini,3 1 an island perched on the westernmost edge of Little Bahama Bank, from south Florida.3 2 The continental
shelf off south Florida is very narrow, ranging in width from four miles to
3
only several hundred feet.2
The area north of the Bahamas and east of Florida is known as the Blake
Plateau. It is generally thought to be a portion of the North American
continental shelf which sank to a much greater depth through a faulting
process. 35 The Blake Plateau is, therefore, part of the continental margin. The
distinction between shelf and margin is significant in determining whether an
area is subject to exclusive coastal state jurisdiction.36
27. See notes 150-153 and accompanying text, infra.
28. Since 1945 exclusive coastal state control over the adjacent waters and seabed has
increased dramatically. For a graphic demonstration of this trend, compare 4 M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 2, at 21-33 which contains a chart indicating national claims to ocean areas,

with 6 R.

CHURCHILL, M. NORDQuIsT & S. LAY, NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 881-84
(1977), which contains a similar compilation. The following developments are revealed: The
territorial sea has increased in width from three miles to six, nine, or twelve miles. Fishery
zones, once limited to three miles, are now 200 miles. For the seaward limit of the shelf
regime, see note 142 and accompanying text, infra.
29. See appendix A. Line A-B-C-D-E-P and beyond represents the single United States
maritime boundary. See Fishery Conservation Zone, Notice of Limits, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937
(1977). The Bahamas claims separate boundaries for its EEZ, line M-N-O-E, and continental
shelf, line A-B-O-P. See Bahamas Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act,
reprinted in U.N. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 192 (1977). See text accompanying notes 217 & 219
infra.
30. The depth of the water in the Florida Straits ranges between 350 and 450 fathoms
(average depth 2,150 feet). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration publishes
charts which detail ocean depths in the Florida-Bahamas region. See Nautical Charts Nos.
11460 & 11009, published by the United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Survey.
31. Bimini is the closest Bahamian island to the United States mainland. It has a small
local population supported entirely by the sport fishing and tourist industries. See U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS 184 (rev. ed. 1976).
32. See Nautical Charts Nos. 11460 & 11009, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id. See appendix A.
35.

E.g., K. EMERY 8- E.

UCHUPI, WEsTERN NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN: TOPOGRAPHY, ROcKS,

STRUCTURE, WATER, LIFE AND SEDIMENTS (1972); Stehli, The Geology of the Bahama-Blake
Plateau Region, in THE OCEAN BASINS AND MARGINS 15

(1974).

36. The continental shelf is the portion of the continental margin nearest the coast
Generally, the shelf extends out from shore at a relatively constant depth until it slopes
abruptly toward the deep ocean floor. This deeper area, while generally beyond the reach
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This paper will examine and analyze the United States-Bahamas maritime
boundary dispute and predict the probable outcome of a judicial or quasijudicial settlement.3 Several ancillary issues will be examined, including,
whether the claims bear any reasonable relation to the current law of maritime boundary delimitation; 3s whether the probable judicial outcome would
yield an internationally supportable result39 thereby facilitating meaningful and
equitable pre-litigation settlement negotiations; and whether further doctrinal
developments in the law of the sea are necessary and, if so, what form they
should take.4 °
THE INTERNATiONAL LAW OF
BouNDARY DELIMITATION

MAInImnE

Prior to 1945, the oceans were viewed as a public highway upon which all
nations were entitled to conduct essential commercial and security activities.4 1
International law developed the principle of freedom of the seas, 42 and
implicit in its formulation was the widespread belief that minimum order required the oceans to remain public.43 Exclusive national maritime jurisdiction
was limited to three discernible regimes: inland waters," such as rivers and
of current mining technology, is geologically similar to the shallower shelf. Eventually, the
sedimentary material of the continental margin gives way to the igneous basalt of the deep
ocean floor. See E. LUARD, supra note 3, at 1-32. It is unsettled whether the margin is part
of the shelf regime or part of the public regime of the deep seabed. See text accompanying
notes 209-212 infra.
57. An agreement to submit the dispute to the ICJ or an arbitral court might resemble
the United States treaty with Canada. See note 16 supra.
38. See generally Adede, Toward the Formulation of the Rule of Delimitation of Sea
Boundaries Between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coasts, 19 VA. J. INT' L. 207 (1979)

(clarity and precision are lacking in this area).
39. See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 260 infra.
41. See The Jesse, the Thomas F. Bayard and the Peschawa (Great Britain v. United
States), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 57 (1929). Owners of British vessels were awarded damages
for lost revenues caused by United States enforcement of seal conservation laws. Three
British schooners, engaged in hunting sea otters in the North Pacific, were boarded by
officers of the United States Cutter Bear, which was enforcing an American conservation law.
No skins were found, but the hunters' weapons were placed under seal. In imposing liability
for expense incurred by the vessels, the arbitral tribunal held that the bona fides of the
United States officers were irrelevant. A mere error in judgment was sufficient to create
liability, as freedom of the seas and therefore British sovereignty had been breached.
42. For a discussion of the history of the doctrine, see 4 M. WHiTEMAN, supra note 2, at
501. Also see note 2 supra.
43. See The Jessee, the Thomas F. Bayard and the Peschawa (Great Britain v. United
States), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 57, 59 (1929). The arbitral court decided, without hesitation,
that good faith errors in judgment could not absolve liability, even where demonstration
of damages was highly speculative. This treatment of the freedom of the seas doctrine is
representative of the importance placed on uninterrupted use of the oceans.
44. See, e.g., The Faber Case (Germany v. Venezuela), 10 R. Intl Arb. Awards, 438,
457 (1903) (arbitral court sustained Venezuela's absolute right to control navigation in the
Catatumbo and Zula Rivers, over German objectives that the general interests of mankind
created an implied easement of necessity).
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bays, in which nations exercised full sovereignty; 45 the territorial sea,46 a threemile belt contiguous to the coast, in which nations exercised full sovereignty
subject to the right of innocent passage;4 7 and the claims of belligerent states
in time of war, whose temporary closures of ocean areas were deemed lawful
48
security measures.
The notion of freedom of the seas was given firm expression in The Le
Louis. 4 9 Sir Walter Scott, writing for the 1817 court, held that England lacked
competence to enforce an anti-slave trade law50 against a French vessel on the
high seas.5 ' The right of nations to the uninterrupted use of the oceans was
held to preclude this affirmative exercise of sovereignty on the high seas,
despite the desirability of tile legislative objective.5 2
The modern trend toward greater closure of the oceans began in 1945 with
the Truman Proclamation. .,3 This document, which became the doctrinal
foundation for the legal regime of the continental shelf, 54 was a unilateral
declaration by the United States of jurisdiction and control over the resources
of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf appertaining to its shores.55
The proclamation did not affect the legal status of the waters adjacent to
this seabed, which remained open to public use. 56
45. A nation may lawfully exercise the full range of national powers in inland waters.
In the United States there has been controversy between the states and the federal government over where that power resides. Cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (Black,
J.) (states own tidelands within their boundaries, but exclusive federal jurisdiction begins
at the mean low water mark); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (Howard) 212 (1845) (states
own inland waters because they entered the Union on an "equal footing" with the federal
government).
46. The United States has traditionally claimed a three-mile territorial sea limit. See
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33-35 (1947).
47. Innocent passage is the corollary to freedom of the seas within the territorial sea
area. While the regime is one of actual sovereignty, it is a norm of customary international
law that states may use the area for merchant or peaceful defense transit, where the action
is not hostile. Cf. The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. 4.
The International Court of Justice held that Albania had to compensate the United Kingdom
for the damage to ships and loss of life that occurred when Albania fired on the ships and
mined the straits. The United Kingdom was engaging in intelligence gathering operations
in connection with aiding anti-leftist factions in the Greek Civil War. The court upheld
the British activities as within the regime of innocent passage. Contra, ICNT U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 1 (1979), reprnted in 10 M. NoRnquisT & K. SIMMONDS, NEW DiRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 142-43 (1980), which would proscribe the British activities
in the Corfu Case. This trend has been criticized as a detriment to world security and order.
See M. McDOUGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note I, at 204-14.
48. See generally 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 503-04.
49. 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817).
50. England contended that slave trade had been abolished by treaty between itself and
France, and by act of Parliament. Id. at 1464.
51. Apparently, the seized vessel was English, masquerading as a French ship to avoid
the anti-slave trade law. Id.
52. Id. at 1478.
53. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and
Seabed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 943 (1945).
54. See North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] I.C.J. 12.
55. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53.
56. Id.
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According to the Truman Proclamation, the United States possessed
competence to exercise exclusive control over the continental shelf, because
it was the natural prolongation57 of its territory. 5 This natural prolongation
metaphor became the ownership theory50 of the shelf regime. Its application
makes a variety of geophysical features relevant to analysis of maritime
boundary delimitation.60 The drafters anticipated the need to establish
boundaries where the United States shared a continental shelf with a neighboring coastal state. Consequently, the proclamation provides that these
boundaries are to be established through negotiation "in accordance with
equitable principles."'
The idea of exclusive control over the continental shelf gained rapid international acceptance, 62 and numerous unilateral declarations of shelf jurisdiction were issued by nations in all parts of the world.6 3 The emergent
continental shelf regime soon became a norm of customary international
law.64 In recognition of this trend, the International Law Commission (ILC)6 5
57. Id. Natural prolongation is a reference to the geological relationship between the
continental margins and the continents themselves. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
58. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53.
59. When the Truman Proclamation was issued, coastal state control over the adjacent
seabed was unknown. Natural prolongation implies that political control over the land
mass carries with it certain inherent rights to the appurtenant shelf. For a discussion of
early developments of the legal regime of the shelf, see Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 376 (1960).
60. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] I.C.J. 12, 54-55, the ICJ enumerated
a non-exclusive list of physical features designed to define the natural prolongation of the
nations involved. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
61. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53.
62. Although popularity of the shelf regime spread rapidly, it had not attained the
status of a customary norm as of 1952 in the view of one arbitral court. &ee The Abu
Dhabi Case, (Petroleum Development, Ltd. v. Abu Dhabi), 1 ITr'L &COMp. L. Q. 247, 253-60
(1952). The Sheik of Abu Dhabi, one of the Trucial States of Arabia bordering the Persian
Gulf, granted a concession contract to Petroleum Development, Ltd. for exploitation of oil
resources in "the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and
its dependencies and all the islands and the sea waters which belong to that area." In 1949
Abu Dhabi issued a "Truman Proclamation" of its own, reprinted in National Legislation and
Treaties Relative to the law of the Sea, U.N. Legislative Series, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1
(1959), and the oil company argued that the 1939 contract granted it rights under the new
regime. The arbitral umpire, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, held that no international law
of the shelf existed in 1939 and none had crystallized in 1949. Therefore, the oil company
could claim no rights to resources outside the territorial sea. Its rights in the territorial sea
had also been disputed, but were upheld by the court as a matter of contract construction.
Accord, Petroleum Dev. (Qatar) Ltd. v. Ruler of Qatar, 18 I.L.R. 161 (1950).
63. See 1 S. LAY, R.

CHURCHmL

& M. NomQuisr, NEw DIxEcrxoNs

IN THE LAw or

na

SEA 307-52 (1973) for reprints of various unilateral declarations of shelf jurisdiction, e.g.,
Iran (1955) id. at 307-22; Malaysia (1966) id. at 322-26; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(1968) id. at 347-52. During the 10 years following the Truman Proclamation the following
Latin American countries claimed continental shelf jurisdiction: Argentina, Mexico, Chile,
Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Honduras. See Phleger, Revent Developments Affecting the
Regime of the High Seas, 33 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 934, 937-39 (1955).

64. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] I.C.J. 12, 19-21.
65. The International Law Commission (ILC) was established by resolution of the

General Assembly to draft multilateral conventions, attempt the codification of international
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met in 1951 to analyze the shelf regime. This work culminated in the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva Convention). 6
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention describes the method for determining
the presumptive boundary of a shared seabed area when a negotiated settlement has not been achieved. ' 7 In situations where two opposite states" share a
continental shelf, the boundary is a median line,6 9 the points being equidistant
from the baselinesr0 from which the limits of the territorial seas of the two
states are drawn. Where two states are adjacent, 71 a line drawn by connecting
points selected along the adjacent coasts at equidistant points seaward
establishes the boundary.72 The ILC recognized that relatively minor physical
74
features, such as the presence of small islands 3 or the unique shape of a coast,
might cause the boundary line to deviate disproportionately if the formula
was applied mechanically. Consequently, article 6 permits the boundary to
deviate from the equidistance line where special circumstances exist. 75
The status and operation of the equidistance-special circumstances rule
law, and consider ways to make "evidence of customary international law more readily
available." G.A. Res. 174, 2 U.N. GAOR Doe. A/519, at 105 (1949).
66. See generally Young, The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First
Impression, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 733 (1958).
67. See Geneva Convention, art. 6(1), supra note 6, which provides: "Where the same
continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite
each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured."
68. Id.
69. Id. The term median line is applied to opposite states, while equidistance line is
applied to adjacent states where the Geneva Convention is controlling.
70. Baselines, or straight baselines, refers to the rule of the Fisheries Case (United
Kingdom v. Norway), [1959] I.C:[. 116. The ICJ held that Norway could lawfully delimit
its territorial sea by drawing lines connecting the small rocks and islands known as the
Skjaergaard Archipelagoe. The archipelagoe is located up to 50 nautical miles off the
Norwegian mainland, and the court's ruling created a huge jurisdiction of inland waters
for Norway. Since no fishery zone regime existed at that time, Norway was the first nation
to gain exclusive control over the fishery resources off its shores.
The problems connected with the straight baseline rule are apparent. The presence of a
small barren rock 50 miles from shore can operate to capture huge areas of ocean for exclusive use. See Karl, Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysis, 71 AM. J. 17T'L L. 642 (1977). See also R. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and
Special Circumstances, in LAW OF THE SEA. THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS (1973).
71. See Geneva Convention, art. 6(2), which provides: "Where the same continental
shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental
shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and
unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be
determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured."
72. Id.
73. See note 70 supra.
74. The dilemma of West Germany in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969]
I.C.J. 12, provides a classic example. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text, infra.
75. See notes 67 & 71 supra.
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were disputed by West Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (North Sea Case).76 Application of the rule
resulted in two equidistance lines intersecting at a point very near the West
German coast.77 Consequently, West Germany was left with a comparatively
small area of continental shelf considering the length and location of its
coast.78 Failing to negotiate a boundary treaty, the parties agreed to submit the
dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).7 9
Although the Netherlands and Denmark were parties to the Geneva
Convention, 80 West Germany was not,"' and it therefore claimed article 6(2)
was inapplicable.2 West Germany contended that a correct boundary should
grant each state a just and equitable share of the available shelf in proportion
to the length of its coastline or sea frontage. 3 In the alternative, West
Germany argued that if article 6(2) was applicable, the concave shape of its
coast was a special circumstance84 requiring departure from the equidistance
lines. Denmark and the Netherlands countered that article 6(2) was applicable
as a customary norm of international law and opposed the categorization of
the West German coast as a special circumstance 85
The court held that article 6(2) had not attained the status of a customary
norm. 8 Moreover, West Germany's proportion formula was rejected as it
resembled equitable apportionment7 rather than a legal delimitation in
accordance with equitable principles. 8 The ICJ was therefore pressed to find
applicable standards and rules of customary international law.
The court found these standards in the Truman Proclamation and accordingly held that national jurisdiction over seabed resources resulted from
sovereignty over the adjacent land mass.8 9 From this conceptual foundation,
the court concluded that West Germany was entitled to that portion of the
North Sea shelf area that was the natural prolongation of its territory.90 The
opinion placed the parties under a duty to negotiate a settlement 9' in ac76. [1969] I.C.J. 12,20.
77. Id. at 14. See appendix B. This map was prepared for the court by the parties. Line
C-D-E represents the equidistance line for West Germany and the Netherlands. Line A-B-E
represents the equidistance line for West Germany and Denmark. The lines intersect at
point E, cutting off West German jurisdiction. Line E-F represents the equidistance line
between Denmark and the Netherlands. Lines C-D-F and A-B-F represent the West German
claim that it was entitled to coastal jurisdiction in proportion to the length of its coastline.
[1969] I.C.J. at 20-21.
78. [1969] I.CJ. at 17.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id. at 19-20.
81. Id.

82. Id. at 20.
83. Id. at 21.
84.

Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at20.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. See text accompanying notes 95 & 96 infra.
1969 I.C.J. at 53.

90.

Id.

91. Id. at 53-54. The parties had not empowered the court to actually delimit the
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cordance with equitable principles 92 which, as developed by the court, included
the area constituting the natural prolongation of the coastal state; the general
configuration of the coast; the physical and geological structure and natural
resources of the area; and a reasonable degree of proportionality given the
length and general direction of the coast. 93
The ICJ in the North Sea Case claimed to be applying a rule of law that
determined a boundary from the physical facts of the area. 94 The court denied
that it was equitably apportioning the area. It is difficult, however, to discern
a cognizable legal standard within the term equitable principles. 95 The nonexclusive taxonomy of considerations which that term was said to subsume
could offer little guidance [or future boundary dispute resolution. The court
announced no affirmative standard at all; it simply reached a just determination based on the narrow facts of the caseY0 Following the North Sea Case,
advisors to nations attempting to negotiate a maritime boundary97 could offer
decision makers little guidance in the promulgation of claims which would
ostensibly withstand judicial analysis. 98
The North Sea Case stood alone in the law of shelf delimitation until 1977,
when a court of arbitration- 9 decided the United Kingdom-France Continental
Shelf Case (Anglo-French Case). 00 This decision marked the first judicial
settlement of a maritime boundary dispute between parties to the Geneva
area. The issue of which principles of international law were applicable was the sole question
presented.
92. Id. at 54. The courts use of the Truman Proclamation's equitable principles formulation has become the leading foundational doctrine in the area. See text accompanying note
112 infra. See generally Goldie, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Ray of Hope
for the International Coast?, 16 N.Y.L.F. 327 (1970).
93. [1969] I.C.J. at 54.
94. Id. at 46-47. The court said: "On a foundation of very general precepts of justice
and good faith, actual rules of law are here involved which govern the delimitation of
adjacent continental shelves- that is to say, rules binding upon States for all delimitations;
-- in short, it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice,
but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles, in
accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal regime
of the continental shelf in this field."
95. The list of physical features that the court articulated as relevant was inclusive.
Id. at 53. Equitable principles must be redefined with reference to the facts of a particular
delimitation dispute. As a result, the impact of a given physical feature on the boundary
process cannot be anticipated.
96. West Germany signed bilateral treaties with Denmark and the Netherlands on
January 28, 1971. The boundaries gave West Germany approximately two-thirds of the
jurisdiction it claimed before the I.C.J. For the text of the protocol jointly announcing the
agreements and the two treaties, see 10 I.L.M. 600-01 (1971).
97. See note 95 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 260-263 infra.
99. The Arbitration Agreement of 10 July, [1975] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 137 (Cmd. 6280).
100. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French
Republic Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (France v. United Kingdom) (1977) [hereinafter cited as Anglo-French Case], reprinted in S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
OCEAN DEvELOPMENT (Supp. 1978). The decision has not been published in an official source.
Citations will be by reference to paragraphs. For a visual description of the dispute see the
map reproduced in Colson, supra note 17, at 107.
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Convention.1°1 The Anglo-French Case is significant because the court found
more harmony than discord between customary law as announced in the North
Sea Case and article 6 of the Geneva Convention; 0 2 indeed, the court found
the two rules in accord. 03
The boundary dispute involved in the Anglo-French Case was twofold. In
regard to the English Channel, the parties disputed the boundary consequences of the presence of the Channel Islands. 0 4 These British protectorates0 5
are located a few miles off the French coast. Their inclusion as basepoints in
the median line process of article 6(1), which Britain claimed was applicable,
would have moved the boundary line to within a few miles of France.100 This
formulation would have granted the United Kingdom virtually the entire
shelf in the southern end of the English Channel.
France countered that article 6(1) was not controlling, because, upon ratifying the Geneva Convention, it had entered valid reservations to its applicability
with regard to the Channel Islands.'-' Alternatively, France argued that,
should the court find article 6(1) applicable, the presence of the Channel
Islands was a special circumstance which warranted departure from the
median line. 0 8 France proffered a solution to the dispute: the Channel
Islands should be ignored in drawing the median line and granted an independant six-mile enclave 09 of territorial sea jurisdiction.
Although the court found the Geneva Convention a treaty in force
between the parties, it upheld French reservations to article 6(1) and applied,
instead, customary international law." 0 The court departed from the North
Sea Case, however, in holding that the equidistance-special circumstances rule
was a norm of customary law,"' and that its application would lead to the
same result: a boundary in accordance with equitable principles. 1 2 Deciding
the Channel Islands were a special circumstance, the court delimited the area
by drawing a median line which ignored their presence."13 The court then
created a twelve-mile enclave of territorial sea to the north and west of the
101. The United Kingdom ratified the Geneva Convention on May 5, 1964. France
ratified on June 14, 1965. See 2 S. LAY, R. CHURHcm & M. NonQuIsT, supra note 63, at
804-05.
102. See Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 65.
103. Id.
104. Id. paras. 152-54.
105. The Channel Islands are of unique political status. They are neither part of the
United Kingdom nor a colony; they are a quasi-independent state and have a direct dependency on the Crown. The United Kingdom argued the political and economic importance as well as the size of the population (180,000) as a justification for their inclusion
in the delimitation process. See Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 178; Belcher.
Equitable Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 67 (1979).
106. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 161.

107. Id. para. 65.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. paras. 150-51.
Id.
Id. para. 148.
Id. paras. 237-42.
Id.
Id. para. 95.
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islands. 114 In the court's view, this result honored both the Channel Islands'
existing fishery zone and afforded France jurisdiction over the natural prolongation of its territory. 115
The second facet of the dispute concerned the boundary in the Atlantic
region lying west of France and south of the United Kingdom.",, France
contended that the Scilly Isles," x7 which lie several miles off the southeastern
tip of the United Kingdom, were geographically insignificant,"18 and should
not be included as a basepoint in the delimitation process. 1 9 The United
Kingdom invoked article 6 and contended that the boundary should be an
120
equidistance line drawn with the Scilly Isles as a basepoint.
The court was concerned that inclusion of the Scilly Isles, a relatively
minor geographical feature, 121 would deflect the boundary several degrees
closer to France. 22 As the line advanced seaward, it would progressively capture
more shelf jurisdiction for the United Kingdom, thus depriving France of
23
jurisdiction over a portion of the natural prolongation of its territory.
Implicit in this concern was the notion that there exists a necessary relationship between the extent of a nation's shelf jurisdiction and the significance
124
of the physical features which create it.
The court agreed with France that the presence of the Scilly Isles was a
special circumstance and delimited the area by emphasizing the natural prolongation principle." 5 Noting that the Scilly Isles extended twice as far out
114. Id.
115. Id. para. 246. But see Blecher, supra note 105, at 62. The court found natural prolongation to be of little usefulness in the Channel Islands region because the seabed of the
English Channel was geologically similar to the land masses of both nations. The court
found other relevant considerations more compelling in delimitating the area. See text
accompanying note 122 infra.
116. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 244.
117. A group of 48 small islands located 31 nautical miles off Land's End, England.
Six of the islands are populated, with a total of 2,500 residents. See Colson, supra note 17, at
109 n.33. The Scillies, under the straight baseline rule, would provide the extreme seaward
point from which the equidistance line would be derived. By comparison, the French Island
of Ushant, which would form the extreme French basepoint, is located only 14.1 nautical
miles out to sea. Id.
118. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 238.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. paras. 248-49. The court noted, however, that both the Scilly Isles and Ushant
were natural geographical facts of the region which could not be totally disregarded. The
court's reference to the size and population of the islands is evidence that these features
are relevant circumstances in shelf delimitation.
122. See Colson, supra note 17, at 110. The equidistance lines drawn with and without
regard to the Scilly Isles diverged approximately 16 degrees. The size difference of the
English and French claims to shelf jurisdiction was approximately 4,000 square miles.
123. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 244.
124. See Blecher, supra note 105, at 73-75. The court distinguished between proportionality as discussed in the North Sea Case, and its application of the principle to the
Anglo-French facts. To the arbitral court, proportionality was a criterion or factor by
which the distorting effects of small islands or other physical anomalies could be measured.
Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, paras. 100-01.
125. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, paras. 248-49.
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to sea as the opposite French island of Ushant,128 the court decided to give the
Scillies half-effect as a basepoint in the delimitation process. Consequently,
the court drew an equidistance line disregarding the presence of the Scillies,
and a second line giving the islands full effect.' 27 The resulting angle was
then bisected to arrive at the maritime boundary.' This is known as the
half-effect12 process.
Like the ICJ in the North Sea Case, the Anglo-French Case court of
arbitration insisted that its function was not to redress inequalities of geography, but to equitably apply rules of law to a specific set of facts and thus
determine the correct maritime boundary. 130 At first glance, the Anglo-French
Case appears to have interjected into the delimitation process some of the
certainty of expectation necessary to a coherent, efficacious legal system.
Specifically, the court held that the equidistance-special circumstances rule was
a norm of customary law,'31 and that the two apparently disparate approaches
would each have produced the same result. This conclusion, however, is
puzzling in view of the North Sea Case court's nondescript use of the phrase
equitable principles. 3 2 If the equidistance rule is applied, the task of identifying
special circumstances must be addressed. Neither the North Sea Case nor the
Anglo-French Case provide a standard for measuring claims of special circumstances. Arguably, the lexicon of equitable principles identified in the
North Sea Case forms the beginnings of a standard.1 - Manifestly, however,
special circumstances will remain an ambiguous, ineffective corrolary to the
equidistance rule until it is limited in scope and meaning through judicial
34
decision, treaty, or state practice.
Absent from the law of maritime boundary delimitation is the certainty
of expectation necessary to an effective legal regime. From the perspective
of the Anglo-French Case court, delimitation according to equitable principles
should result in an award to each state of jurisdiction over the natural pro126. See note 117 supra.

127. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, paras. 249,251.
128. Id.
129. The United Kingdom and France had given half-effect to Eddystone Rock, a small

island above water at high tide, in delimitation negotiations. Id. para. 249.
150. Id. paras. 248-49.
131. Id. para. 97.
132. [1969] IC.J. at 54. See Blecher, supra note 105, at 83. In the view of Mr. Blecher, the
court did not adequately explain its failure to give the Scillies full effect. Its use of the
term equitable principles suggests that equity, and not law, persuaded the court to declare
the Scillies a special circumstance. He suggests that intuition played an important part in
the court's deliberations. Id.
133. [1969] I.C.J. at 53-54.
134. The decision of the Anglo-French arbitral court, that the Scilly Isles' location was a
special circumstance, is the only judicial application of the special circumstances rule to
date. A nation can now predict that an island of minor geographic and demographic importance will not be given full effect in the equidistance line process. Apparently, islands
the size of the Scillies will be given half-effect where they are located a significant distance
out to sea. The question arises, whether smaller or larger islands will be treated the same
way. Under the Anglo-French Case, an island's size, location and population will determine
whether it is given full, half, or no effect as a basepoint.
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longation of its territory.1 35 Before this aspiration becomes a reality several
ancillary issues must be resolved. These include the weight to be given a
particular geographical feature, the significance of social, economic, and
political considerations, and the distribution of resources throughout a certain
shelf area. 3 6
The significance of geological features deserves special consideration. If the
natural prolongation metaphor is the applicable theory of ownership, then
evidence of geological compatibility 37 should be highly persuasive. Proof by
one nation that the disputed continental shelf is of the same geomorphological
origin and composition as its own land mass, and is unlike the land mass of
its coastal neighbor, theoretically, should be controlling.138 The proffering
nation has ostensibly shown that the disputed area is the natural prolongation
of its territory.
Further complicating the law of maritime boundary delimitation is the
emergence of a new regime of exclusive coastal state control, the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).' 3 9 Within this belt, which extends 200 nautical miles
from the coastal baseline, nations now claim exclusive competence to harvest
the area's natural resources. 140 Where these zones overlap, the delimitation
135. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, paras. 9, 12.
136. See Alexander, Special Circumstances: Semienclosed Seas, in LAw OF THE SEA: THE
EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 201 (1973) (discussion of the problems of islands, promontories, straits, and other geographic anomalies and their problematic effect in the equidistance-special circumstances rule).
137. Geological compatibility describes the following situation: state A and state B
about the same semienclosed sea. The continental shelf in the area is sedimentary rock which
was washed into the ocean by the decay of the mountain region of state A. State B is a flat
plain formed by fossilized coral reef activity. The continental shelf in the area is geologically compatible with state A. Under the natural prolongation theory, state A's claim to
the shelf is much stronger than state B's. See Blecher, supra note 105, at 65.
138. But cf. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, paras. 9, 12. The Hurd Deep, a distinct
fault in the geomorphology of the English Channel continental shelf, was disregarded by
the court in the delimitation process. Two inferences may be alternatively drawn: first,
since the Hurd Deep is a faulted portion of geologically compatible composition, it is the
natural prolongation of both nations. Second, fault zones, trenches or "deeps" are not
among the relevant circumstances to be considered in delimitation in accordance with
equitable principles. Which view will emerge as controlling is significant to the delimitation
of the Blake Plateau area. See note 238 and accompanying text, infra.
139. See generally Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. Iwr'L L
494 (1977).
140. See ICNT REVISION 1, art. 56, supra note 47, at 154 which provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil
and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with
regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the preservation of the marine environment.
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process again becomes necessary. While the delimitation procedures previously discussed were originated in the context of the shelf regime, current
state practice indicates that the same boundary principles apply to the EEZ.141
A final unresolved issue in the legal regime of the shelf is the seaward
limit of coastal state jurisdiction.142 Early unilateral declarations of shelf
jurisdiction claimed competence over the exploitable resources of the area.143
Under this view, a state's exclusive claim to seabed resources was contingent
only on its technological capability, regardless of the depth of the seabed or
the distance of the site from its coast. 44 Another possible focus is the actual
extent of the continental margin of the coastal state's land mass. 4 5 At some
point out to sea the continental margin ends, and the basaltic ocean floor
begins. 140 While this formulation is consonant with the natural prolongation
theory of ownership, it is unacceptable to those nations whose limited technology prevents access to these deep water margin areas. 47 If the common
heritage of mankind doctrine gains ascendancy,4 s then the seaward limit of
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties
of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be
exercised in accordance with Part VI.
The United States delegation to the 1977 session of UNCLOS III reported general agreement among states regarding this provision. J. BoYD, DiGasr oF Uvn'F STATES PEAarcE iN
INTEmRATioNAL LAW 536 (1977).
141. The 1979 version of the ICNT contains identical provisions for delimiting the EEZ
and the continental shelf. Compare ICNT REviSION 1, art. 74(l), supra note 140 with art.
83(1), supra note 47, at 166, which provides: "The delimitation of the continental shelf
between adjacent or opposite states shall be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles, employing, when appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and
taking account of all the relevant circumstances."
142. See Oxman, supra note 10, at 19-22, reporting the debate at the seventh session of
UNCLOS HI in 1979 over the seaward limits of shelf jurisdiction. Negotiating group 6 discussed several alternatives. The "Irish" formula would limit seabed jurisdiction by analysis
of the thickness of sedimentary rock at the foot of the continental slope. This is a pure
application of the natural prolongation theory. The United Soviet Socialist Republic proposed a plan which would cut off exclusive jurisdiction at 100 nautical miles beyond the
EEZ limit of 200 nautical miles, where the physical margin extends that far. The third
world bloc contested any formula which would permit jurisdiction beyond the EEZ. Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of Meetings, 12 U.N.
GAOR (resumed 8th sess.), 106-07, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/NG6/19 (1979).
143. E.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53.
144. The Blake Plateau located off Georgia is rich in manganese nodules. Should the
exploitabiity test emerge as the shelf regime's outer limit, the United States would have
exclusive jurisdiction over these deposits. Interview with Dr. H. K. Brooks, Visiting Research
Professor and Past Geology Professor at the University of Florida, April 7, 1980.
145. See note 142 supra.
146. Stehli, supra note 35, at 16.
147. See note 142 supra.
148. See Biggs, supra note .24, at 232-34. Advocates of this theory contend that the shelf
regime arose at a time when deep seabed mining was impossible. Therefore, the shelf regime
does not include the exclusive right to mine deep water margin areas.
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the shelf may be limited to the shallower continental shelf proper. 149
This array of overlapping contemporaneous legal regimes has been the
focal point of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III)s 0 The conference is engaged in an attempt to produce a new,
comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea. Its work product, the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) is merely a draft document."' However,
the treatment given the ICNT by the arbitral court in the Anglo-French Case
indicates that the ICNT has achieved a certain degree of authoritative status."

2

While the court said, in dicta, that the ICNT accorded with the rules of
customary law that it applied, it rejected French contentions that the ICNT
53
had rendered the Geneva Convention obsolete.
5
ICNT article 83(l), 4 in its most recent formulation, appears to have
codified the Anglo-French Case. The article provides for delimitation between
opposite or adjacent states in conformity with international law. 155 The article
149. See Oxman, supra note 10, at 22. Another third world solution to the seaward
limit problem is to cut off coastal state jurisdiction at depths below 200 meters.
150. Professor Bernard H. Oxman, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami
School of Law, has provided yearly chronicles of the UNCLOS III sessions. See Oxman, supra
note 10; Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977
New York Sessions, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977);
Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor
the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974).
151. The failure of UNCLOS III to resolve several lingering issues, most notably deep
seabed mining, has led some to wonder if the goal of a new law of the sea treaty can be
reached. See Breaux, Diminishing Prospects for an Acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 257 (1979).
152. See Colson, supra note 17, at 111. Whether the ICNT is ever finalized as a treaty,
certain provisions may attain the status of customary law through state practice. E.g., ICNT
article 83(1), supra note 141.
153. Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 65.
154. See ICNT, art. 83, U.N. Doc. CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3/Add. 1 (1980), reprinted in 19
INT'L L. MATEauALS 1174 (1980). The text of article 83 is reproduced below:
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law. Such an
agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, employing the median or
equidistance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances prevailing
in the area concerned.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph I, the States concerned, in a
spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be
without prejudice to the final delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions
relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions of that agreement.
155. This departs from article 6 of the Geneva Convention which treats opposite and
adjacent states in separate subsections. Apparently, the distinction between these geographic
relationships has blurred. Cf. the Anglo-French Case, where the court termed the relation-
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borrows from the Truman Proclamation by calling for the application of
equitable principles; it then calls for utilization of the median or equidistance
line where appropriate, while taking account of all circumstances prevailing
in the area concerned.' 56
Article 83(1) differs from its immediate predecessor in two ways. First, the
article calls for delimitation under international law, a conspicuous reference
in light of its absence in earlier versions. 157 This clause reintroduces into delimitation analysis the vague, standardless North Sea Case and Anglo-French
Case decisions. Second, the 1980 version of article 83(1) qualifies application
of the median or equidistance line with the phrase prevailing circumstances;'"
the predecessor version spoke of relevant circumstances. 59 As a matter of
construction, prevailing circumstances appears to be a limiting term, 60 indicating that only the most significant features, geophysical or otherwise, will
justify departure from the equidistance line.
Insofar as article 83(1) incorporates the North Sea Case and Anglo-French
Case, perhaps the circumstances to which those courts attached significance
comprise the lexicon of prevailing circumstances.' 6' Yet nothing in either of
those cases suggests that the factors considered therein were exclusive.162 If the
drafters of the ICNT intended to limit the concept of special or relevant
circumstances by inserting the adjective prevailing, their simultaneous reference
to international law may have thwarted the attempt.163 Conceivably, future
courts will sieze this language to exclude minor geophysical features from
consideration. 6 4 Such a decision would bring welcome clarity to a body of
law which otherwise cannot offer the certainty of expectation necessary to
ensure the maximum, reasonable use of ocean resources. Until this clarity
is achieved, there will be a cloud on the title to many resource-abundant
maritime areas, and needless inhibition of public and private development of
those resources.
ship of the nations in the Atlantic region as neither opposite nor adjacent; the court found
the nations "laterally related." Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, paras. 95-97.
156. See ICNT art. 83(l), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.I0/Rev.3/Add. 1 (1980), supra note
154.
157. See ICNT art. 83(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3/Add. 1 (1980), supra note
154.

158. See note 154 supra.
159. See note 141 supra.
160.

See W srBS's TanD Nzw INTEmAToRL4L DicrIONAR

1797 (1971), which defines pre-

vailing as "having superior force or influence." Relevant is defined as "bearing upon or
properly applying to the matter at hand." Id. at 1917.
161. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
162. See Blecher, supra note 105, at 61. The vague content of equitable principles as
applied in both the North Sea Case and Anglo-French Case belies the protestations of both
courts that they were applying legal rules, and not sitting in equity.
163. See IGNT art. 83(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3/Add. 1 (1980), supra

note 154.
164. For example, under the latest version of article 83(1), the United Kingdom might
have argued that the Scilly Isles were not a prevailing circumstance. In this context, the
prevailing circumstance rule resembles the special circumstance rule of the Geneva Conven-

tion.
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THE BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

United States policy on the oceans is a composite of domestic coastal
regulationies and foreign policy. 66 Having long claimed a three-mile territorial sea,16 7 the United States was the first nation to unilaterally declare jurisdiction over the continental shelf. 68 In the international arena, the United
States is caught between domestic pressures for further expansion of exclusive maritime boundaries and resources, 69 and organized resistance by developing nations asserting preferential claims to the resources of presently
public areas. 70
In response to contemporary international trends, the United States claimed
a 200 nautical mile fishery z!one, or EEZ, in the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976.71 Pursuant to the Act, the State Department

published the coordinates of the United States maritime boundary in 1977.172
The line runs equidistant between south Florida and the Great and Little
Bahama Banks through the Florida Straits. 1 73 Northwest of Little Bahama
Bank the boundary turns abruptly due west in a straight, cartographer's
line, 7 4 thus deviating from the equidistance line. The distance between this
line and the northern edge of the Bahamas is between fifty and seventy miles.
At a point 200 miles east of the Florida coast, the statutory limit of United
165. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356 (1979). This law
provides for management, lease authority, resource revenue provisions, and all matters relating to resource exploitation in the shelf area. For legislative history see [1978] U.S. CODE
CoN. & AD. NEws 1450; [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2176. See also Coastal Zone Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1463 (1979) (provides authority for environmental protection).
166. See generally . OScOOD, J. HOLLTCK, M. PEARSON & T. ORR, TOWARD A NATIONAL
OCEAN POLICY: 1976 AND BEYOND (1976).
167. E.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33-35 (1947). See note 45 supra.
168. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53.
169. See note 23 supra. That pressure may be mounting. Consider the advertisement of
Champion International Corporation in the October 27, 1980 issue of Newsweek Magazine. A
full color plate with illustrated dolphins diving amongst submarine tractors and harvesting
machines is opposite the heading "In the future, nations will be dividing up mankind's
common inheritance: the vast wealth of the oceans. But will we do it recklessly or with
vision?" The advertisement goes on to herald the oceans as having the "potential for supplying far more energy, raw material. and food than man has ever dreamed of." The reader is
counseled to consider with caution who owns the oceans. This consciousness-raising
technique can be viewed as an attempt to muster further support for a United States policy
of exclusivity in ocean areas. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1980, at 44-45.
170. See R. ANAND, supra note 21; Biggs, supra note 24.
171. 16 U.S.C. §§1801-1882 (Supp. III 1979). The act replaced an earlier statute designating a nine-mile fishery zone. Act Establishing a Fisheries Zone Contiguous to the Territorial Sea of the United States. Pub. L. No. 89-658, §§1-3, 80 Stat. 908 (repealed 1976).
172. Fishery Conservation Zone, Notice of Limits, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937 (1977).
173. See appendix A. line A-B.
174. Id. Line B-C-D. The precision map maker's line C-D bears no apparent relation
to the geography of the area. Cartographic convenience, the practice of using straight,
generalized lines in maritime boundaries, was considered, by the ICJ, as a relevant consideration in the Anglo-Norway Fisheries Case. Convoluted lines that trace the coastline
present a difficult problem for mariners. The Norwegian fjords presented an extreme
example of that difficulty. See note 70 supra.
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States jurisdiction, the line turns to the northwest and begins to parallel the
United States coastline. 175 This boundary brings within United States control
much of the Blake Plateau that would otherwise fall within Bahamian
jurisdiction if an equidistance or median line were employed.
At the press conference announcing this claimed boundary, the State Department indicated that special circumstances in the area of the Blake Plateau
required departure from the equidistance line.176 These special circumstances
were not identified, and government officials refuse to divulge the substance
77
of the claim.
Under United States practice, this maritime boundary delimits both the
continental shelf and the EEZ.178 This practice raises the question of whether
the Blake Plateau and its resources are part of the continental shelf regime,
or part of the public area of the high seas. Although the seaward limit of the
shelf regime is an unresolved issue,7 9 the United States may have limited
its shelf jurisdiction to the 200 nautical mile EEZ by promulgating a comprehensive, single maritime boundary. This limitation is unnecessary as the
continental margin extends beyond this point, and under the natural prolongation theory of ownership exploitable resources of that area are property
of the United States. 8 0 In any event, the 200 nautical mile EEZ seaward limit
may be an appropriate limit for the shelf regime as well.' 8 ' This issue will
receive more focus when technological advances render deeper margin resources exploitable.
The Bahamas Alteration of Boundaries of 1948182 corresponds to the
Truman Proclamation in unilaterally claiming shelf jurisdiction. The Bahamian document simply extends coastal jurisdiction to include that area
of the continental shelf contiguous to the Bahamian coasts.'8 3 If there is a
theory of ownership within the Bahamian Alteration of Boundaries, it is a
theory of proximity. 8 4 Notably, the Truman Proclamation, while using the
175. See appendix A, line D-E-P and beyond.
176. See Press Conference with Fredrick Z. Brown, Director of the Office of Press Relations of the Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (March 1, 1977), reprinted in J. Bova,
supra note 140, at 557.
177. Id. Telephone interview with Mary Elizabeth Hoinkas, Assistant Legal Adviser on
the Oceans, Environmental Science Affairs, United States Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (May 7, 1980).
178. See J. Born, supra note 140, at 536.
179. See note 142 and accompanying text, supra.
180. This would seem to follow from the holding in the North Sea Case, [1969] I.CJ.
at 54.
181. See Oxman, supra note 10, at 22. While some nations urge ending coastal state
jurisdiction at the 200 nautical mile mark, Professor Oxman expressed concern that the
simple expedient of a single boundary creates more problems than it solves. Such a regime
might lead to "creeping jurisdiction." Since the revenue sharing obligation to the Deep
Seabed Authority begins at 200 miles, there is no reason to limit jurisdiction outside that
limit, if the physical shelf extends beyond it.
182. Order in Council No. 2574, Alteration of Boundaries, December 26, 1948, reprinted
in National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/l, at 31-32 (1948).
183.

Id.

184. Id. The Bahamian Alteration of Boundfitrs claims jurisdiction over the seabed
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term proximity, relied instead on the natural prolongation theory as a justification for exclusive coastal state control.18 5 The United States theory of
ownership incorporates both concepts, while the Bahamian pronouncement
is apparently confined to proximity, giving rise to the question of whether
this doctrinal difference will shape the legal position of either nation.'8 6 The
possible results of such a doctrinal disagreement will be examined further.
The Continental Shelf Act of 1970187 subsequently defined the seaward
limit of the Bahamian shelf as those submerged lands extending to a depth of
200 meters, or beyond that limit to an exploitable depth.""8 This latter caveat
was likely intended to preserve the Bahamian position on the seaward limit
of coastal state jurisdiction as international trends of decision and technological advances render the Florida Straits and the Blake Plateau practically
and legally accessible. 18 9
The Bahamas claimed a 200 mile fishery zone in the Fisheries Resources
Jurisdiction and Conservation Act of 1977.190 Section 11(2)(a) of the Act
asserts that, in the absence of agreement on the boundary of overlapping areas
of jurisdiction, the boundary will be a line twelve miles outside the baseline
from which the territorial sea of the neighboring state is measured,19' that is,
twelve miles from the Florida coast. 192 As to shelf delimitation, section
1l(2)(b)(i)-(ii) provides that where two states share the same continental shelf,
an equidistance line will be employed. 193 Where no continuous shelf is shared,
the limits of the shelf are to be determined by international law. 9 4 As previously noted, international law is unclear on the shelf regime's seaward limit.
Thus it seems that the Bahamas, like the United States, reserves the right to
include the Blake Plateau in its seabed holdings. 95

contiguous to its coasts. In contxast, the Truman Proclamation asserted competence to
exclusive use of the shelf "since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of
the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it." Presidential
Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53. This language is the origin of the term natural prolongation as used in the North Sea Case, [1969] I.C.J. 12.
185. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 53.

186. See text accompanying notes 237-240 infra.
187. Bahamas Continental Shelf Act of 1970, reprinted in National Legislation and
Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, the
High Seas and the Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 172-74 (19'170).

188. Id. §2(1).
189. See note 142 and accompanying text, supra.
190. Bahamian Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act of 1977, reprinted
in National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone,
the Continental Shelf, the High Seas and the Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources
of the Sea, U.N. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 192-203 (1977).
191. Id. §ll(2)(a).
192. See appendix A, line M-N.
193. Bahamian Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act of 1977.
194. Id. §ll(2)(b)(ii).
195. Continental Shelf Act of 1970, supra note 187, §2(1). The Bahamas applies the exploitability test to determine the shelf's seaward limit.
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Although the United States ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention1 9 and
is therefore bound by it, the Bahamas status as a party to the convention is
unclear. It was a member of the United Kingdom's commonwealth when the
United Kingdom ratified the convention in 1964.297 Since achieving independence in 1973, however, the Bahamas has not ratified the convention and
so, arguably, is not a party to it.191 Nevertheless, the holding in the AngloFrench Continental Shelf Case, that the equidistance-special circumstances

rule is a norm of customary international law, apparently renders this issue
unimportant 99
ANALYsis OF rm CLAIMs
The Bahamian Two-Hundred-MileFishery Limit

The Bahamas, as the United States, has claimed a 200 nautical mile
fishery limit.200 As the Bahamian island of Bimini is only fifty miles from the
south Florida coast, there is need to delimit the boundary of these overlapping maritime zones. The Bahamas' has asserted that, in the absence of
an agreement, the limit of its fishery jurisdiction will be a line drawn twelve
miles from the baseline of the neighboring coastal state. 201 This proposed
boundary would trace the Florida coast at a distance of twelve miles off shore
until the 200 nautical mile jurisdictional limit is reached. 20 2 This Bahamian
boundary is an extravagant and unprecedented claim, wholly unsupported by
international law. A rationale for the Bahamian claim is suggested by the
inclusion of the twelve-mile provision; twelve miles is the current maximum
allowable territorial sea limit in international practice.203 The Bahamas has
asserted the maximum possible fishery zone: all the area that is not potentially part of the United States' territorial sea.20 '
Significantly, the Bahamian claim is twofold: it provides for the maximum
fishery zone in relation to swimming fish species, 20 5 yet provides for an equidistance line for fishery resources of the seabed and subsoil. 20 6 This bifurcated
196. The United States ratified the Geneva Convention on April 12, 1961. It entered
into force on June 10, 1964. 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.

197. See note 101 and accompanying text, supra.
198. Although it is sometimes argued to the contrary, a nation is not generally bound
by a treaty which it has not ratified unless it adheres or accedes to it through its conduct.
See The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] I.CJ. at 22. See generally G. voN GL.

n,

supra note 7, at 488.
199. See note 102 and accompanying text, infra.
200. Bahamian Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act of 1977, supra note
190, §5.
201. Id. §11(2)(a).
202. See appendix A, line M-N-O-E.
208. E.g., ICNT Revision 1, art. 3, supra note 47, at 139.
204. Given the importance of security in the territorial sea regime, the Bahamas could
not make a colorable legal claim to exclusive rights within the United States maximum potential territorial sea limits. See generally M. WHrrEr AN, supra note 2, at 1-10.
205.

Bahamian Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act, supra note 190,

§11(2)(a).
206. Id. §11(2)(b). Under the ICNT- and state practice swimming fish- are part of the
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approach is a policy response to the depth of the waters in the Florida Straits
and the Blake Plateau.207 The seabed is at depths far greater than those at
which the continental shelf is usually found.2 0 8 This two boundary approach
recognizes that international law has not resolved the issue of whether deeper
adjacent areas of the continental margin are part of the exclusive shelf
regime, or part of the public area of the high seas. 209 If the test is exploitability,
then these areas are not continental shelf. 21° If the test is geological, and the
subject seabed is continental sedimentary rock rather than basaltic deep ocean
crust, then these areas are part of the shelf regime.11 Should any of the proposed arbitrary depth limitations for the shelf regime become part of international law,212 the majority of the area will be included in the public high
seas regime.
Bahamian decision makers have made a calculated response to this legal
ambiguity. In dealing with the familiar continental shelf they have felt
bound by the rules of that regime and applied an equidistance boundary.213
EEZ regime, see ICNT Revision 1, arts. 63-67, supra note 47, at 158-59. Sedentary species such
as lobsters, clams and crabs are part of the shelf regime. See id., arts. 68 & 77, supra note
47 at 159 & 164.
The spiney lobster is of particular interest. American commercial fishermen had traditionally fished for spiney lobsters in the shallow waters of the Great and Little Bahama
Banks. On July 9, 1975, the Bahamas declared jurisdiction over the spiney lobster as a
living resource of the continental shelf. The United States protested and, in subsequent
negotiations, recommended that. the dispute be submitted to the ICJ. The United States
contended that the Bahamas were bound by international law to recognize the historic
fishing rights of American fishermen. See E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATEs PRAcrIcE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 766, 766-68 (1975).
207. The depth and location of these two seabed areas make unclear whether they are
part of the exclusive shelf regime, or part of the inclusive deep seabed regime. See text
accompanying note 142 supra.
208. See notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text, supra.
209. Under the Bahamian Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act,
supra note 190, Sll(2)(b)(i), the Bahamian fisheries boundary would also include the area's
seabed if the shelf seaward limit issue is resolved to include the Florida Straits and the
Blake Plateau.
210. The Bahamas defines continental shelf to include areas deeper than 200 meters if
the resources of the area are exploitable. Bahamas Continental Shelf Act of 1970, supra note
187, §2(1).
211.
See note 142 supra.
212. E.g., Bahamas Continental Shelf Act of 1970, supra note 187, §2(1). The act sets
200 meters as a possible maximum depth. But see, e.g., Oxman, supra note 10, at 20-21. The
Soviet Union's proposal that the shelf regime extend no further than 100 nautical miles
beyond the 200-nautical-mile EEZ would fix the Bahamian shelf by analysis of the geology
of the area. The point where the natural prolongation of the Bahamas ends would mark the
limit of its shelf jurisdiction.
213. Bahamian Fisheries Resources Jurisdiction and Conservation Act, supra note 190,
§ll(2)(b)(i)-(ii) which provides:
(i) where there is a continuous continental shelf between the Bahamas and the
neighboring state, a line every point of which is equidistant from the edge of the Great
and Little Bahama Banks and the baselines from which the territorial sea limits of
that state are drawn, and, in areas other than the Great and Little Bahama Banks, a
line every point of which is equidistant from the baselines respectively from which the
territorial sea limits of the Bahamas and that state are drawn;
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However, in delimiting their fishery zone, or EEZ, they have not felt compelled to apply the equidistance-special circumstances rule.214 Implicity, the
Bahamas has declared that the existing rules of maritime boundary delimita2 15
tion are inapplicable to the newer, developing EEZ regime.
In contrast, the United States has announced a single maritime boundary
which delimits both the continental shelf and EEZ jurisdictional limits.216
The single boundary is the prevailing international practice 217 and is preferable for several reasons. A single boundary requires a single delimitation
and thus simplifies and expedites the dispute settlement process. Further, the
equitable principles governing continental shelf delimitation are equally
relevant to fair resolution of disputes over the EEZ.2 18 The equidistance-special
circumstances rule possesses a logical appeal which invites mutual application
to both the shelf and EEZ regimes.
The benefits of simplicity and symmetry are less compelling, however, when
the origins and doctrinal foundations of the two regimes are closely examined.
The Truman Proclamation infused the shelf regime with the natural prolongation metaphor theory of ownership.219 The coastal state is competent
to claim shelf areas, because those areas are geographically and geologically
the natural prolongation of that state's land mass. In contrast, the notion of
national competence in the EEZ originated with judicial recognition of
historically created prescriptive rights to exclusive use. 220 Two decisions of the
ICJ, the Anglo-Norway Fisheries Case221 and the Icelandic Fisheries Case,222
held that continuous reliance by an indigenous population on the fisheries of
2
its adjacent waters created a preferential right to exploit those resources. 23
(ii) where there is not a continuous continental shelf between The Bahamas and the
neighbouring state, the limits of the continental shelf of that state shall be as determined
by international law.
214. Id. §11(2)(a).

215. The Bahamian position is consonant with the historically maverick positions of
Latin American Nations. See generally Rosental, Some Brief Considerations on a Caribbean
Condominium, in RrIONAUZATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA (1977).
216. See Fishery Conservation Zone, Notice of Limits, supra note 29.
217. For example, in the Anglo-French Case the court delimited a single maritime

boundary applicable to all ocean regimes without considering whether separate boundaries
might be more appropriate.
218. See note 181 and accompanying text, supra.
219. See discussion of competing American and Bahamian theories of ownership, supra
note 184.
220. But see Rozental, supra note 215, at 47. In the late 1940's and early 1950's Panama,
Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua established 200-mile zones. The nations were situated

on a coastal area which possesses very little physical shelf area. In response to the
emerging shelf regime, these nations made analogous claims to adjacent waters. This
development accelerated the trend toward greater ocean closure.
221. The United Kingdom-Norway Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951]

I.C.J. 116.
222. The United Kingdom-Iceland Fisheries Judgment (United Kingdom v. Norway)

[1974] I.C.J. 3.
223. [1951] I.C.J. at 159 (long Norwegian usage of local fisheries resources created
certain legally cognizable economic interests); [1974] I.CJ. at 34. (United Kingdom usage of
fisheries near Iceland created legally protectable interest).
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Consequently, there exists two contemporaneous regimes with disparate
theories of ownership. Whether international law will develop separate sets
of boundary delimitation rules for each regime is unclear. The trend toward
a single maritime boundary indicates that the rules of shelf delimitation are
24
being incorporated into the EEZ regime.2
Assuming that a single maritime boundary is applicable, the Bahamian
fishery claim must fail, absent a showing of special circumstances. It is highly
unlikely that such special circumstances exist; 2 2 s the Bahamians simply claim

all of the area which cannot lawfully be considered part of the United States'
territorial sea. The claim is therefore predicated on policy objectives, not on any
cognizable special circumstances as that term has been developed. 22 6 The presumptive boundary is the equidistance line which even the Bahamians have
2 27
recognized as appropriate in the context of the shelf regime.
The United States Claim of Special Circumstances
In the Blake PlateauArea
Assuming that the equidistance-special circumstances rule is applicable
in defining a single maritime boundary, the United States claim in the Blake
Plateau area is somewhat mysterious. The United States claims an equidistance line boundary through the Florida Straits.22 8 This formula is then

abandoned at a point approximately sixty miles due north of the northwest
tip of Little Bahama Bank, where the boundary cuts abruptly due east and
proceeds to a point 200 nautical miles from the Florida coast, 229 the statutory

seaward limit of United States jurisdiction.23 0 According to the State Department, special circumstances in the area mandate this departure from the
equidistance line.231 The nature of these alleged special circumstances is not
in the public record, and the State Department, concerned with preservation
of the United States position in future negotiations, declines to divulge this
information.

23 2

The legal justification for the claimed United States boundary is a matter
for speculation. Notably, a straight cartographer's line marks the non-equidistance boundary to the north of the Bahamas, 233 suggesting that physical
features are not the substance of the alleged special circumstances.234 The
United States and Bahamian claims may merely represent initial bargaining
224.
225.
physical
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See note 141 supra.
See appendix A, Line M-N-O-E. A look at the geography of the area reveals no
features which would operate to create the Bahamas' claimed fishery boundary.
See text accompanying note 203 supra.
See appendix A, line A-B.
See appendix A, line A-B.
See appendix A, line B-C-D-E-P.
16 U.S.C. §1801 (Supp. II1 1979).
See note 176 supra.

232. See note 177 supra.
253. See appendix A, line C-D.
234. The line bears no apparent relation to either the equidistance line or to the
geographic layout of the area under the equitable principles doctrine of the North Sea and
Anglo-French cases.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss2/4

26

Allen: Law of the Sea: The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between

1981]

MARITIME BOUNDARY: U.S. AND BAHAMAS

positions, with each nation cautiously placing abundant bargaining chips on
the negotiating table. One claim may be a response in kind to the other, each
nation apprehensive that an international tribunal will simply split the
difference between the competing claims. This apprehension may be justified
because both the North Sea and Anglo-French decisions are hallmarked by the
language of compromise.235 The half-effect rule gives equal weight to the legal
arguments of both nations. In the present dispute, this would work to the
distinct disadvantage of the nation that claimed the equidistance line. If a
court employs a half-effect solution, the nation with the larger claim would be
the benefited party. 23 6 Therefore, decisional law provides strong incentive for
coastal neighbors in a maritime boundary dispute to make the largest possible
claims to the disputed area.
Alternatively, there may be a plausible physical justification for the United
States special circumstances claim. According to the leading theory regarding
the origin and geomorphology of the area, the Blake Plateau is the faulted
continental shelf of the North American continent,23 7 the natural prolonga-

tion of the United States mainland. The Great and Little Bahama Banks are
a carbonate platform built directly on the igneous basalt of the deep ocean
floor. 238 Florida, while also a carbonate platform, is built upon the sedimentary rock of the American continent.2 39 The United States may argue that
the Blake Plateau, by virtue of this common geomorphology, is properly
included in its continental shelf jurisdiction.
Both the North Sea Case and Anglo-French Case included geology as a
proper consideration in the delimitation process, 2 40 though neither decision
235. See North Sea Continenial Shelf Case, [19 69 ] I.C.J. at 54. (court's inclusion of
proportionality as an equitable principle suggests a compromise between the parties' legal
positions); Anglo-French Case supra note 100, para. 261 (the half-effect simply bisected the
two proffered claims of the parties).
236. For example, the Bahamas has claimed an equidistant boundary for the continental
shelf in the Blake Plateau. The United States, alluding to special circumstances, has claimed
virtually the entire area. Should a court reach a compromise solution, the Bahamas will
lose vast areas of valuable shelf jurisdiction.
237. See Stehli, supra note 35 at 25-27.
238. Id. at 23-25. Volcanic activity forced the Atlantic sea floor to rise at the Mid-Atlantic
Ridge. The volcanic material spread in both directions, reaching as far west as the presentday Florida Straits. Coral reef activity began on this shallow sea floor, forming carbonate
platforms of fossilized organic matter. The Great and Little Bahama Banks were formed
when the oceanic crust began 'to cool and sink, and unusually active reef formations
continued to grow to sea level. For unknown reasons, no coral reef activity took place in
the Florida Straits. See also K. EmERY & E Ucirun, supra note 35, at 432.
239. See K. EMERY & E. Ucmis', supra note 35, at 428-33. The North American
continental margin in the Atlantic area was formed by the erosion of the Appalachian
Mountains. As this material was washed out to sea, it formed the Blake Plateau. The
region later faulted to its present depth. Florida was built by coral reef activity on this
continental margin. As the margin sank, coral reefs grew to sea level. This process accounts
for the absence of a substantial continental shelf off the south Florida Atlantic coast.
240. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1969] I.CJ. at 54; Anglo-French Case, supra
note 100, paras. 9, 12. Apparently, geology played a minor role in the Anglo-French Case.
The court chose to ignore the presence of two geologic anomalies; the Hurd Deep in the
English Channel, and the Hurd Deep Fault Zone in the Atlantic region.
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declared its significance. Reliance on geology as a special circumstance is
problematic. The question arises whether geology is merely one of many
circumstances relevant to a shelf delimitation, or whether it is dispositive.
If the natural prolongation metaphor is given dispositive status, a United
States demonstration of its common physical heritage with the Blake Plateau
and the relative dissimilarity of the Bahamas geological formations would
conclusively resolve the boundary dispute. Natural prolongation finds its
origin in the Truman Proclamation and was declared the proper objective of
delimitation in accordance with equitable principles by both the North Sea
Case and Anglo-French Case.2 41 From this a court might attach great sig-

nificance to a United States proffer of geological compatibility.
The opposing view, and an anticipated Bahamian rebuttal, treats geological compatibility as one of the many circumstances deemed relevant in the
North Sea Case and Anglo-French Case.242 Arguably, the term natural prolongation contemplates not only geology, but also geography and non-physical
circumstances.24s The Bahamas might rely on the equitable principles announced in the North Sea Case and contend that the proposed United States
delimitation does not comport with them. First, the Bahamas might argue that
the geography of the area is an equally important consideration, that
proximity is a component of natural prolongation.2- Second, the Bahamas
might contend that the United States boundary fails to adequately consider
the reasonable degree of proportionality principle, and that the length of
Bahamas abutting coastline entities it to more jurisdiction than the United
States line would provide. :45 Third, the Bahamas might argue that because
the Blake Plateau is the only marine area contiguous to its coast having the
potential of significant mineral resources, 24" the United States boundary is per
241. North Continental Shelf Sea Case, [1969] I.C.J. at 53-54; Anglo-French Case, supra
note 100, para. 246.
242. For an exhaustive discussion of the North Sea and Anglo-French cases and the
equitable principles rubric, see Karl, supra note 70, at 642-51.
243. See [1969] I.C.J. at 52. The court admonished the parties to take into consideration
all relevant circumstances.
244. Id. Consider the ICJ's opinion that the equidistance principle produced an inequitable result in the North Sea Case. The lack of a prior standard by which the court
could measure inequity suggests that the court's conclusion was intuitive. See note 1M2
supra. See appendix B, line A-B-E-D-C. The rough triangle formed by these points includes
a manifestly small area of jurisdiction given the relative size, shape and importance of the
three nations involved.
This intuitive inequity is missing in the United States-Bahamas equidistance boundary
line. See appendix A, line A-B-O-P. Necessarily, submarine geologic features are less visually
compelling than surface geographic features, natural prolongation notwithstanding.
245. For purposes of delimitation, the northern rim of Little Bahama Bank forms
the relevant coastline. See appendix A. This area is ringed with numerous small islands and
flats which form a series of straight baselines. Of these islands only Walker's Cay is significantly inhabited. See Nautical Charts, supra note 30. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra
note 31, at 185-86.
246. The Blake Plateau is a potentially significant source of petroleum. Interview with
Dr. Francis G. Stehli, Chairman, Department of Geology, University of Florida, in Gainesville (October 1, 1980). It is not. known whether the disputed portion of the Blake Plateau
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se inequitable. 247 Fourth, the Bahamas might invite an economic comparison
of the two nations, and claim that its status as a developing nation is a relevant
circumstance in the delimitation process. 248 Elevating developing nation status
to a relevant or special circumstance would be a significant, if not unanticipated,
development. 249 To this date, however, no court has been confronted with
this argument.
These two competing views of natural prolongation illustrate the confusion
that the term has created in the law of the sea. The term can best be understood in its historical context. When the United States issued the Truman
Proclamation, coastal state control over contiguous maritime zones was unknown in international law. 250 A theory of ownership was necessary to
legitimize any exclusive claim to a previously public area, and the natural
prolongation metaphor supplied this element.
But the invocation of the natural prolongation theory through a United
States claim of geological compatibility with the Blake Plateau does not
validate exclusive United States jurisdiction over the area. Geological compatibility need not alone define the term natural prolongation. While there
is an appealing logical symmetry to a delimitation process that awards a
coastal nation the physical shelf of its existing territory, and the theory
served well in validating and legitimizing early exclusive shelf claims, it is inequitable to allocate strategic, vital natural resources wholly on the basis of
the origin of the subsoil thousands of feet beneath the adjacent seabed.
Geological compatibility ought to be dealt with as one of a non-exclusive
list of relevant circumstances to be applied in the resolution of maritime
251
boundary disputes.
It is possible and, indeed, preferable for international law to reach an
accommodation between these two competing views of natural prolongation.
If the Truman Proclamation retains any vitality as the conceptual underpinning of the shelf regime, such an accommodation is necessary. 252 Since
geological compatibility is analogous to natural prolongation,253 it might be
given stronger consideration than other physical features. Adopting the
rationale of the Anglo-French Case, an affirmative showing of geological com-

contains manganese nodules in commercially significant concentrations. See E. LuARW, supra
note 3, at 26.
247. See 1969 [I.C.J.] at 54 (court listed local natural resource distribution as a relevant
factor, but failed to develop the thought further).
248. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
249. See generally D. LEIPIGER 8. J. MUDGE, SEABED INERAL .SOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC
Irmazsrs oF DEmvLOPING CouNTmss 83-120 (1976).
250. See text accompanying notes 52 & 53 supra.
251. See note 244 supra.
252. See Anglo-French Case, supra note 100, para. 62. The court, in delimiting the
Channel Islands region, said: "Mhe effect to be given to the principle of natural pro.
longation of the coastal State's land territory is always dependent not only on the particular geographical and other circumstances, but also on other relevant circumstances of
law and equity."
253. See Blecher, supra note 105, at 65.
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patibility might result in the application of a half-effect process. 254 In the
instant dispute, the court- would draw two lines: one an equidistance line,
the other a line reflecting the United States claim of special circumstances.
The court would then bisect the resulting angle to arrive at the maritime
2 55
boundary.
This natural prolongation half-effect approach is an attractive possible
solution to this doctrinal dilemma. To treat natural prolongation as a consideration separate from and superior to other relevant circumstances preserves that model as the conceptual cornerstone of coastal state jurisdiction.
This theory of ownership is a corollary to territoriality, and is, therefore, a
256
useful linguistic tool in the formulation of workable legal principles.
CONCLUSION

The several standards which comprise relevant circumstances are a vague
collection of situational considerations which raise more questions than they
answer. The lawyer, whether legal adviser to a nation's decision makers, or
counsel to prospective off-shore resource developers, is confronted with a bewildering array of irreconcilable considerations which provide little or no
assistance in the essential predictive function. 25 7 There is simply no way to
anticipate with certainty the degree of influence that a given physical feature
will have in a specific factual context. Thus, where two nations have yet to
negotiate a settlement, the legal status of a disputed area is unknowable. The
portion of the Blake Plateau which the United States and the Bahamas both
claim will remain in legal limbo until domestic or international political
negotiate in earnest 258 or submit the
pressures influence the parties to either
25 9
dispute to an international tribunal.
More certainty in the law could be achieved through several doctrinal developments and refinements. First, the role of natural prolongation needs to
be critically examined and clarified. It is, at best, a convenient, familiar theory
of ownership that provides a reasonable conceptual foundation for development of a workable system of maritime boundary delimitation. At worst, it is
a talismanic contrivance that, carried to its logical extreme, can produce absurd
and inequitable results.260 Natural prolongation as a theory of ownership may
and
be beneficially employed as a guide to any equitable delimitation process
261
circumstances.
relevant
of
clarification
the
for
point
as a reference
254. See text accompanying notes 126-129 supra.
255. See appendix A. Such a line would bisect the angles formed by lines B-O-P and
B-C-D-E-P.
256. See ICNT art. 83(1), supra note 154, which makes no reference to natural prolongation. However, natural prolongation is incorporated by reference in the clause calling for
agreement in conformity with international law.
257. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text, supra.
258. The United States has successfully negotiated a maritime boundary with Cuba.
Maritime Boundary Modus Vivendi, Signed April 27, 1977, United States-Cuba, 28 U.S.T.
5285, T.I.A.S. No. 8689.
259. See note 16 supra.
260. See note 244 supra.
261. For the opinion that further judicial expression is needed see Colson, supra note
17, at 111-12.
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Second, the lexicon of relevant or special circumstances should be clearly
articulated, defined, and limited. The Anglo-French Case and North Sea Case,

while dealing with many so-called circumstances, failed to articulate a standard
by which to weigh or define them.28 2 The predictive process, so necessary to
meaningful boundary negotiation, will be impossible until this ambiguity is
6
eliminated.23
Third, the equidistance-special circumstances rule must be reexamined in
light of current trends of decision. As a norm of customary international law,
it has proven an unsatisfactory principle. The divergent claims of the United
States and the Bahamas, both ostensibly applying the rule, is primary evidence
that reform is necessary. 2 - The IGNT's adoption of the term prevailing circumstances2 65 is a promising modification as it may be easier to fashion standards
for circumstances which "prevail" than for circumstances which are merely
"relevant." Unfortunately, ICNT article 83(1) incorporates by reference the
North Sea Case and Anglo-French Case, thus reintroducing into the process
26
the analytical vagueness of those decisions.
Perhaps the most serious obstacle facing the international community in
267
its quest for clarity is the nature of the international legal process itself.
Ambiguity and uncertainty are inherent components of any legal system.
They are especially characteristic of a legal system in which compliance is
largely voluntary. 268 The desire for certainty of expectation must be tempered
with the realization that no nation will subscribe to even the most coherent
legal order if it is inimical to its national interests. 8 9 Notwithstanding, there
is considerable global support for the refinement and crystalization of maritime boundary delimitation rules270 which, through clarity and certainty of
expectation, facilitate and expedite resolution of pending disputes.
PHLn A. ALLEN III
262. See text accompanying notes 133 & 134 supra.
263. The need for certainty of expectation has not gone unnoticed at UNCLOS III. See
Adede, Law of the Sea: The Scope of the Third-Party, Compulsory Procedures for Settlement of Disputes, 71 AM. J. IcrVL L. 305 (1977).

264. See text accompanying notes 228-230 supra.
265. See note 154 supra.
266. See text accompanying notes 158-161 supra.
267. See note 12 and accompanying text, supra.
268. See note 15 supra.
269. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
270. See R. HODGSON & H. SMITH, BOUNDARIES OF TnE ECONOMIC ZONE IN LAw oF Ta
SEA: CONFERENCE OUTCOMES AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 183, 203-04 (1976) for a survey

of various mechanical boundary rules designed to create certainty of expectation in the
equitable delimination of maritime boundaries.
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